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Title VII & The Civil Rights Act of 1991: 
What Professional Firms Should Know 
[W]hateuer affects the condition of women, their habits and their 
opinions, has great political importance in my eyes. 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The employment practices of professional firms may be on 
a collision course with the law. Section 107 of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991 declares that an unlawful employment practice is 
established "when the complaining party demonstrates that 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating 
factor for any employment practice, even though other factors 
also motivated the practice."2 Although innocuous at first 
blush, this passage essentially abolishes3 an employer's "mixed 
motive" defense4 and increases the likelihood that more profes-
sional firms will be sued for discriminatory hiring and promo-
tion decisions. 
Interestingly, this change occurs at a time when the legal 
profession is projected to experience little or n·o growth during 
the 1990s. 5 Making the situation more complex is that since 
1986, sixty-two percent of entering first year law students are 
either female or minority students.6 Thousands of minority 
and female associates who graduated from law schools in the 
mid-1980s are currently being or soon will be considered for 
partnership-an institution long dominated by white males.7 
1. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, Vol. II, 209 (H. Reeve 
trans., 1945). 
2. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107(a), 105 Stat. at 107fi 
(adding subsection (m) to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988)) (emphasis added). 
3. If an employer demonstrates that it would have made the same decision 
absent the impermissible discrimination, it will still be liable. However, such evi-
dence may limit the plaintiffs award. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
166, § 107(b), 105 Stat. at 1075. 
4. See infra note 40 and accompanying text. 
5. Steven Brill, The Law Business in the Year 2000, AM. LAWYER, June 1989, 
at 6. 
6. Hattie-Jo P. Mullins, Women and the Law: Will Real Life Catch Up to 
T.V.?, Ms., June 1987 at 64, quoting 1986 U.S. Labor Department statistics. 
7. According to a 1988 survey "more than 90 percent of the partners in the 
nation's largest law firms are white males." Doreen Weisenhaus, Still a Long Way 
99 
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This article is not intended to critique the law, but rather 
to provide an overview of recent caselaw regarding discrimina-
tion in the partnership selection process. It also suggests poli-
cies and procedures professional firms should implement to 
limit Title VII liability. 
II. TITLE VII AND THE GENESIS OF DISCRIMINATORY 
SUITS AGAINST PROFESSIONAL FIRMS 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended in 
1972, declares: 
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect 
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin.8 
On more than one occasion, the United States Supreme 
Court has emphasized that the "central statutory purposes" of 
Title VII are "eradicating discrimination throughout the econo-
my and making persons whole for injuries suffered through 
past discrimination."9 Despite these lofty goals, for nearly 
twenty years employment law under Title VII dealt almost 
exclusively "with the problems of providing equal opportunity 
for employees who work with their hands rather than with 
people, paper or ideas."10 As a result, many professional firms 
assumed Title VII did not apply to their decisions about whom 
to make a partner. 
to C'TO for Women, Minorities, NAT'L L.J., Feb. R, 1988, at 1, 48-58. 
Only 25 years ago, women were recognized as second class citizens in the legal 
profession: "Women, no matter what their ethnic or racial affiliations, usually have 
greater difficulty than men in establishing themselves as lawyers. Clients tend to 
shun them, and employers, if they will hire any women for lawyer positions usual-
ly keep them in less responsible and less important jobs." QUINTINE JOHNSTONE & 
DAN HC>PSON, JR., LAWYERS AND THEIR WORK 19 (1967). 
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (19R8). 
9. Abermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (197fi); see also Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 264-6fi (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
For a brief discussion of the legislative history of Title VII of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act, see Mark S. Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed Motive 
Title VII Action: A Social Policy Perspective, R2 COLUM. L. REV. 292 (1982). 
10. Andrea R. Waintroob, The Developin,; Law of Equal Employment Opportuni-
ty at the White r:ollar and Professional Level, 21 WM. & MARY L. REV. 4fi, 46 
(1979). 
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However, the 1984 Supreme Court decision Hishon v. King 
& Spalding11 made clear that Title VII applied to partnership 
admission decisions and that the opportunity to be considered 
for partnership is a "privilege of employment."12 Despite earli-
er indications that a law firm's partnership decisions fell under 
the aegis of Title VII, 13 Hishon sent shockwaves throughout 
the legal community. 14 
A. Hishon v. King & Spalding15 
1. Facts 
Elizabeth Hishon was a seven-year associate with the large 
Atlanta law firm of King & Spalding, a general partnership 
under Georgia law. In 1980, King & Spalding had fifty partners 
and employed fifty associate attorneys. No woman had ever 
been a partner. 16 As was customary at the end of an 
associate's sixth year, King & Spalding considered whether to 
admit Hishon to the partnership in May 1978. The firm reject-
ed Hishon's application. One year later, the firm again refused 
to admit Hishon to the partnership. 17 Consistent with the 
firm's "up or out" policy, Hishon was notified to begin seeking 
employment elsewhere. 18 
Hishon subsequently filed a claim with the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission, claiming that King & 
11. 467 U.S. 69 (1984). 
12. !d. at 77. 
13. Before the Supreme Court decided Hishon, at least 3 federal district courts 
specifically addressed Title VII's application to the legal profession. Lucido v. 
Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (holding that an asso-
ciate attorney's allegation of firm's discrimination and unlawful termination and 
refusal to make him a partner are actionable under Title VII); EEOC v. Rinella & 
Rinella, 401 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ill. 1975), appeal dismissed, 496 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir. 
1974) (holding that the professional nature of defendant law firm does not exempt 
it from Title VII suit by associate attorneys); Kohn v. Royall, Koegel & Wells, fi9 
F.R.D. fi15 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), appeal dismissed, 496 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding 
that female student not hired by large law firm may bring class action suit under 
Title VII for discriminatory hiring practices on behalf of all similarly situated wom-
en). 
14. Rowland L. Young, Law Firm Partnership Decisions Subject to Title VII, 70 
A.B.A. J. 108 (1984); W. Connolly, Admtsswn to Partnership Subject to Title VII, 
N.Y.L.J., June 8, 1984, at 1, col. 1.; Arthur J. Marziale, Jr., Note, Hishon v. Kinf? 
& Spaldinf.?: Implications for the Private Partnership, 14 CAP. U. L. REV. 1fi1 
(1984). 
15. 467 u.s. 69 (1984). 
16. !d. at 71. 
17. !d. at 72. 
18. 678 F.2d at 1024. 
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Spalding had violated Title VII by discriminating against her 
on the basis of sex. Hishon alleged that the firm promised 
promotion to partnership as "a matter of course" for associates 
who received satisfactory evaluations as a recruiting device. 19 
Hishon claimed that these promises were a key factor in her 
decision to join King & Spalding.20 Hishon sought backpay 
and compensatory damages if her claim for reinstatement and 
elevation to partnership failed. 21 
2. Procedural History 
The federal district court dismissed Hishon's complaint for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, reasoning that Title VII did 
not apply to partnership selection decisions.22 The Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed,23 and the United 
States Supreme Court reversed in a unanimous decision writ-
ten by Chief Justice Burger.24 
3. Court's analysis 
As an initial matter, the Supreme Court ruled that "[o]nce 
a contractual relationship is established, the provisions of Title 
VII attach."25 The Court held that consideration for partner-
ship may properly be a "term, condition, or privilege of employ-
ment" if "the evidence at trial establishes that the parties con-
tracted to have [Hishon] considered for partnership."26 Since a 
contract for employment may be either express or implied, the 
contractual relationship between Hishon and King & Spalding 
did not preclude liability under Title Vll. 27 
The Supreme Court also ruled that an aggrieved employee 
does not necessarily have to prove that the alleged "term, con-
dition, or privilege of employment" is specifically contained in 
the contract itself. An employer may provide its employees with 
so many "benefits" that the benefit comes to be viewed as a 
19. 467 U.S. at 71-72. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 25 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) para. 81,70:{, at 
20,062, 20,064 (N.D. Ga. 1980). 
28. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1026 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. 
granted, 459 U.S. 1169 (1983). 
24. 467 U.S. at 69. 
25. Id. at 74. 
26. ld. at 75. 
27. Id. 
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privilege: "[a] benefit that is part and parcel of the employment 
relationship may not be doled out in a discriminatory fashion, 
even if the employer would be free under the employment con-
tract not to provide the benefit at all."28 
In short, the Court ruled that regardless of whether or not 
a formal employment contract exists, an employee may make 
out a Title VII claim if the alleged discrimination involved a 
"benefit" of employment which had come to be viewed as an 
essential part of the employment relationship. In demonstrat-
ing that consideration for partnership was "part and parcel" of 
the employment relationship, the Supreme Court emphasized 
that King & Spalding's associates "regularly expected to be 
considered for partnership"; that "lawyers outside the firm 
were not routinely considered" for partnership; and that King 
& Spalding "explicitly used the prospect of ultimate partner-
ship to induce young lawyers to join the firm."29 Significantly, 
the Court made clear that the firm's "up or out" policy demon-
strated that the opportunity for partnership was an essential 
part of employment at King & Spalding: associates are "ter-
minated if they are not elected to become partners."30 
As part of its analysis, the Court evaluated King & 
Spalding's main argumene1 that elevation to partnership is a 
change in status from an "employee" to "employer" and that an 
offer to become an "employer" is not itself an offer of employ-
ment. The Court responded that: 
The benefit a plaintiff is denied need not be employment to 
fall within Title VII's protection; it need only be a term, con-
dition or privilege of employment .... Accordingly, nothing in 
the change of status that advancement to partnership might 
28. ld. 
29. Id. at 76. 
30. Id. 
31. The Court rejected, with very little elaboration, King & Spalding's ancillary 
argument that partnerships are exempt from Title VII scrutiny. The Court rea-
soned that "nothing in the statute or legislative history ... support[s] such a per 
se exemption. When Congress wanted to grant an employer complete immunity, it 
expressly did so." 467 U.S. at 77. 
Similarly, the Court rejected King & Spalding's argument that imposing liabil-
ity for partnership selection decisions infringes on the constitutional rights of ex-
pression or association. The Court cited Norwood u. Harrison, 413 U.S. 4fifi, 470 
(1973), for the proposition that "[i]nvidious private discrimination may be character-
ized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amend-
ment, but is has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections." 467 
U.S. at 78. 
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entail means that partnership consideration falls outside the 
terms of the statute32 
4. Powell's Concurrence 
Despite the self-proclaimed narrowness of the Court's hold-
ing,33 Justice Powell, former president of the American Bar 
Association, wrote to "make clear ... that the Court's opinion 
should not be read as extending Title VII to the management of 
a law firm by its partners."34 Justice Powell also pointed out 
that the relationship among law partners and the dynamics of 
intra-partnership decision-making differ fundamentally from 
the traditional employer-employee relationship. 35 Law firms 
may not unlawfully discriminate during the admissions pro-
cess, but law firms should be able to make 'judgmental and 
sensitive decisions" which "embrace a wide range of sub-
jects."36 
B. What Hishon Means 
The impact of Hishon is twofold. First, Title VII protections 
apply to partnership admission decisions. Second, plaintiffs can 
pursue sex discrimination claims against professional partner-
ships. 
III. HARBINGER OF REFORM: 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins37 
Since Hishon, no Supreme Court ruling has specifically 
addressed the denial of partnership status in a private law 
firm. 38 Although Hishon means that sex discrimination claims 
against law firms are legally tenable under Title VII, Hishon 
32. ld. at 77. 
33. See id. at 77-7R n.10, where C.J. Burger emphasizes the Court's "narrow 
holding." 
34. ld. at 79. 
35. ld. at 79-81. 
36. ld. Powell listed such "subjects", including "profits and other types of com-
pensation; work assignments, approval of commitments in bar association, civic, or 
political activities; questions of billing; acceptance of new clients; questions of con-
flicts of interest; retirement programs; and expansion policies." Id. at 79-80 n.3. 
:37. 490 U.S. 228 (19R9). 
3R. However, at least nne lower court opinion since Hishon has considered a 
large Philadelphia law firm's sexual discriminatory practices. Ezold v. Wolf, Block, 
Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 7!\1 F. Supp. 1175 (E.D. Pa. 1990); see infra text accompany-
ing notes 115-21. 
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did not provide any specific guidance about the type of sex dis-
crimination that could support a successful Title VII claim. The 
next Supreme Court decision that grappled with sex discrim-
ination in a professional firm's partnership selection process 
was Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 39 a "mixed motive" case,40 
which served as a catalyst for major Congressional reform of 
Title VII.41 
A. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 
1. Facts 
Ann Hopkins, a senior manager at Price Waterhouse's 
Office of Govemment Services in Washington D.C., was pro-
posed as a candidate for partnership in 1982, after working five 
years with the firm. Of the eighty-eight persons considered for 
partnership that year, Hopkins was the only woman.42 Forty-
seven candidates were admitted as partners; twenty-one were 
rejected; and twenty, including Hopkins, were "held for recon-
sideration" the following yearY Thirty-two Price Waterhouse 
partners evaluated Hopkins' candidacy. Thirteen favored ad-
mission, eight voted against partnership, eight did not know 
her well enough to form an opinion, and three recommended 
that her candidacy be placed on hold.44 
Hopkins' positive evaluations stressed her "deft touch," 
"strong character, independence and integrity" and character-
ized her as "an outstanding professional." One evaluator com-
mented that she was "extremely competent [and] intelligent" 
and another that she was "strong and forthright, very produc-
tive, energetic, and creative."45 
Virtually all the partners' negative comments focused on 
Hopkins' interpersonal skills, including the perception that she 
was sometimes "overly aggressive, unduly harsh, difficult to 
work with, and impatient with the staff."46 One partner de-
39. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
40. "Mixed motive" cases arise when an employer considers both illegitimate 
factors (such as an individuals race, sex, religion, or national origin) and legitimate 
faclors (such as incompetence, misconduct, or poor qualifications or experience). 
Mount Healthy Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284-Rfi (1977). 
41. See infra text accompanying notes 69-78. 
42. 490 U.S. at 233. 
43. !d. 
44. !d. 
45. !d. at 234. 
46. ld. at 234-3fi. 
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scribed her as "macho" and another opined that she "overcom-
pensated for being a woman." A third evaluator recommended 
"a course at charm school," while another partner advised that 
her chances for partnership would be improved the next year if 
Hopkins would "walk more femininely, dress more femininely, 
wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry."47 
Before Hopkins' candidacy could be re-evaluated the next 
year, Price Waterhouse advised Hopkins that she would not be 
reconsidered for partnership.48 Hopkins resigned and brought 
a Title VII claim against Price Waterhouse. 
2. Procedural History 
The district court found that Price Waterhouse had refused 
to promote Hopkins for both legitimate and illegitimate rea-
sons.49 The district court held Price Waterhouse liable, but de-
clined to order backpay and re-instatement.50 The U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the district 
court's decision on liability, but reversed on relief. 51 The Su-
preme Court reversed in a plurality opinion by Justice Brennan 
joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens.52 
3. Court's Analysis and Holding 
a. Brennan's Plurality. The Court found no error in the 
district court's factual finding that Price Waterhouse used sex 
stereotyping in declining to promote Hopkins to partnership. 
The plurality held that 
[O]nce a plaintiff in a Title VII case shows that gender played 
a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant 
may avoid ... liability only by proving that it would have 
made the same decision even if it had not allowed gender to 
play such a role.53 
47. !d. at 28!'i. 
48. !d. at 28:3 n.l. 
49. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1114-20 (D.D.C. 1985). 
The legitimate reasons included her harsh treatment of staff and the perceived 
defects in her interpersonal skills. The illegitimate reasons were partners' com-
ments based on gender stereotypes. 
50. !d. at 1122. 
51. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 82!'i F.2d 4fi8, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
52. 490 U.S. at 258. 
58. !d. at 244-45. 
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In addition, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals 
because it had incorrectly applied the "clear and convincing 
evidence" standard to Price Waterhouse's claim that it would 
have made the same decision without the discriminatory evalu-
ations. 54 Rather, the correct standard was "preponderance of 
the evidence,"55 the conventional standard employed in civil 
litigation under Title VII.56 The plurality also suggested the 
employer could satisfy this evidentiary burden with "objective 
evidence."57 
In short, the plurality held that if an employer refuses to 
hire or promote an employee based on both illegitimate, dis-
criminatory motives and legitimate, nondiscriminatory motives, 
the employer will not be liable if it can demonstrate by a "pre-
ponderance of the evidence" that it would have made the same 
decision absent the discriminatory motive. 58 
b. Concurring Opinions. Justice White agreed that the 
proper standard is preponderance of the evidence, but took ex-
ception to the plurality's requirement that the employer submit 
objective evidence. 59 Rather, White suggested that an 
employer's own credible testimony would suffice.60 
Justice O'Connor wrote a separate opinion concurring in 
the judgment, but disagreed with the plurality's conclusions 
about the substantive requirement of causation under the stat-
ute. 51 
54. Id. at 254-55. 
55. ld. at 253. 
56. ld. 
57. ld. at 252. 
58. ld. at 244-45. 
59. ld. at 260. 
60. ld. at 261. The plurality commented that this suggestion was "baffling." ld. 
at 252 n.l4. 
61. ld. at 261. For an excellent discussion of the different standards of causa-
tion espoused in Price Waterhouse, see Mark C. Weber, Beyond Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins: A New Approach to Mixed Motive Discrimination, 68 N.C. L. REV. 495 
(1990). 
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c. Dissenting Opinion. Justice Kennedy, along with 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, dissented, ques-
tioning the plurality's causation standard and burden of proof 
formulation. 62 
4. Further Proceedings on Remand 
On remand to the district court, Judge Gesell offered both 
parties the opportunity to introduce new evidence on the issue 
of liability.63 Both sides chose to have the district court deter-
mine liability based on the evidence already presented.64 Ap-
plying the preponderance of the evidence standard, Judge 
Gesell ruled that he was not persuaded that Price Waterhouse 
would have rejected Hopkins' candidacy for partnership had 
Hopkins not been a woman.65 Judge Gesell ordered Price Wa-
terhouse to elevate Hopkins to partnership status and award 
backpay and attorneys fees. The Court of Appeals affirmed.66 
B. Response to Price Waterhouse 
Price Waterhouse generated calls from legal commentators, 
civil rights advocates, the plaintiffs bar,67 and politicians who 
sought "congressional action" to reverse the effects of the Su-
preme Court's perceived indifference to civil rights. 68 
62. 490 U.S. at 280-81. 
63. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 737 F. Supp. 1202, 1204 (D.D.C. 1990). 
64. !d. at 1204. 
65. !d. at 1206-07. 
66. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 920 F.2d 967 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
67. Price Waterhouse will expand the zone of caution [for the plaintiffs bar in 
taking Title VII cases] and, correspondingly, expand the areas in 
which unconscious attitudes or even conscious prejudice operate. 
The plaintiffs counsel will have to determine not only whether 
there is evidence of discrimination but also whether the plaintiffs 
record is such that the employer might prevail because of the 
"same decision principle" .... [Plaintiffs] counsel will become more 
cautious, and only those plaintiffs who have both evidence of dis-
crimination and a good work record are likely to find representa-
tion. 
Alfred W. Blumrosen, Society in Transition II: Price Waterhouse and the Indiuidual 
Employment Discrimination Case, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 1023, 10110 (1990). 
68. See wnerally William B. (}(mld, IV, The Supreme Court and Employment 
Discrimination Law in 1989: Judicial Retreat and ConJ?ressional Response, 64 TlJL. 
L. REV. 14811 (1990). Another commentator wrote "[R]ecent Supreme Court decisions 
[including Price Waterhouse] ... signal the perception of some Justices that the 
harshest forms of discrimination have been substantially eliminated and that the 
doctrines should now be reshaped to allow employers more leeway." Blumrosen, su-
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1. Congressional Response 
In late 1989, Congressman Augustus F. Hawkins (D-Cal.) 
introduced House Bill 400069 and Senator Edward M. Kenne-
dy (D-Mass.) introduced a similar bill in the Senate70 to create 
the "Omnibus Civil Rights Act of 1990." The bill's stated pur-
pose was to overturn five Supreme Court decisions 71-all from 
the Court's 1989 term-which were seen by the bill's propo-
nents as weakening important employment discrimination 
protections under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 72 The 
bill was also meant to increase the remedies available to vic-
tims of employment discrimination and harassment. 73 
2. Opposition and Conciliation 
Private employers and the Bush administration vigorously 
opposed the bill.74 President Bush vetoed what he had previ-
ously branded a "quota bill."75 However, congressional support 
for a civil rights bill did not subside. Under political pres-
sure,76 President Bush lent support for a compromise bill engi-
pra note 67, at 1061. 
Ironically, Justice Brennan, whose Price Waterhouse opinion became a lightning 
rod of criticism, wrote, during the 19R9 term, that Congress' assertiveness in over-
ruling Supreme Court decisions demonstrates its willingness "to overturn this 
Court's mistaken interpretations of Civil Rights Statutes." Patterson v. McLean 
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 200-01 n.9 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
For an interesting overview of Congressional attempts to overrule various Su-
preme Court civil rights decisions from the mid-1980s, see Abner J. Mikva & Jeff 
Bleich, When Conwess Overrules the Court, 79 CAL. L. REV. 729, 740-48 (1991). 
69. H.R. 4000, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1989). A similar bill was also introduced 
by Congressman Campbell (D-Cal.). H.R. 341i5, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (19R9). 
70. S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1989). 
71. ld. The five Supreme Court decisions included Patterson v. McLean Credit 
Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); 
Wards Cove Packing Cove v. Atonion, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); Martin v. Wilks, 490 
U.S. 71ili (19R9); Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989). 
72. DAVID A. CATHCART & MARK SNYDEZMAN, American Law Institute & Ameri-
can Bar Association, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991 13 (1992). 
73. ld. 
74. Employers were troubled that the bill went beyond "restoring prior federal 
civil rights laws and proposed a new remedial scheme including jury trials, possi-
ble compensatory and punitive damages for intentional discrimination claims under 
Title VII, and changes in the 'business necessity' defense frequently invoked in 
disparate impact cases." ld. 
71i. Commerce Clearing House, Inc., CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991: LAW AND EX-
PLANATION 3-4 (1991). 
76. By October 1991 President Bush reportedly began softening his position and 
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neered by Senator John Danforth (R-Mo.) and Senator Kenne-
dy. With the President's approbation, the bill passed easily 
through Congress.77 On November 21, 1991, President Bush 
signed into law the Civil Rights Act of 1991.78 
IV. CONGRESS REVERSES THE SUPREME COURT 
A pertinent provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, is 
Section 107: "Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, 
an unlawful employment practice is established when the com-
plaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment 
practice, even though other factors also motivated the prac-
tice."79 
This provision, as intended, abrogates Price Waterhouse's 
essential holding. No longer will an employer escape liability if 
it can prove that it would have made the same decision absent 
discriminatory motives.80 However, the "same decision" doc-
trine remains relevant in the remedial phase of the mixed-
motive litigation. If the employer successfully argues that it 
would have made the same decision without discrimination, the 
employer will not be required to reinstate the plaintiff, grant 
backpay or pay compensatory or punitive damages. However, 
courts may still order declaratory and injunctive relief and 
backing away from the "quota bill" label. One legal periodical reported that 
[a] heightened public awareness of sexual harassment evolving from the 
confirmation hearings of Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas, and 
the rise of David Duke, the former Ku Klux Klan leader who became a 
Republican gubernatorial candidate in Louisiana, are two factors thought 
to have caused Bush's sudden shift on civil rights legislation. 
Julia C. Ross, New Civil RiRhts Act, 7R A.B.A. J. Rfi (1992). 
77. The Senate passed the bill 73-22. 137 CoNO. REC. 815,967-6!'! (daily ed. 
Nov. 5, 1991); 'l.'he vote in the House of Representatives was 3R1-3R. 137 CoN<:. 
REC. H9557-58 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991). 
78. Ross, supra note 76, at 85. 
79. 42 U.S.C.A. §2000e-2(m) (West Supp. 1992). 
80. This new rule for mixed motive cases makes Title VII litigation unique 
from other areas of employment law. For example, an employer can avoid liability 
under the National Labor Relations Act, codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1fi1-169 (1988), by 
showing that an employee who alleges that he was discharged in part because of 
his union membership or activities would have been discharged for another, legiti-
mate reason. NLRB v. Transportation Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. ;~98 (1988). 
Similarly, for claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), an employer can escape 
liability for allegedly violating an employee's First Amendment free speech rights, 
if the employer can show that it would have reached the same decision absent the 
illegitimate motivation. Mount Healthy Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 
(1977). 
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award attorney's fees and costs, even if the employer makes a 
"same decision" showing.81 
A. Limits on Liability 
One of the central compromises82 of the 1991 Civil Rights 
Act is the provision that limits possible awards in job discrimi-
nation suits according to the size of the defendant employer: 
$50,000 for employers with 15-100 employees; $100,000 for 
employers with 101-200 employees; $200,000 for employers 
with 201-500 employees; and $300,000 for those with more 
than 500 employees.83 These liability award caps84 apply in 
cases involving discrimination based on sex, religion, and dis-
ability, but not to racial minorities. Victims of racial discrimi-
nation may receive unlimited compensatory and punitive dam-
ages under the Civil Rights Act of 1866.85 
Firms with fourteen or fewer employees are exempt from 
Title VII liability.86 The number of employees is based on the 
number of persons employed by an employer in each of twenty 
weeks during the current or preceding calendar year.87 Pre-
sumably, the twenty weeks do not need to be consecutive. Un-
der Hishon, associates who expect to be considered for partner-
ship as part of their employment contract are "employees."88 
However, it is unclear whether partners are considered "em-
ployees."89 Since sixty percent of the nation's attorneys prac-
Ill. CATHCART & SNYDEZMAN, supra note 72, at 14. 
H2. !d. at 25. 
H3. Section 102, Civil Rights Act of 1991, now codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 19H1-
a(b)(3) (West Supp. 1992). 
84. These liability caps apply to "each complaining party." !d. "Complaining 
party" is defmed as "the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, The Attorney 
General, or a person who may bring a cause of action or proceeding" under Title 
VII. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981-a(d)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1992). As explained by legal com-
mentators 
The EEOC, as part of its enforcement efforts, often brings suit on behalf 
of several complainants in the same action. A literal reading of the Act 
indicates that the EEOC would be limited in such suits to the single 
statutory cap on damages, regardless of how many persons it was repre-
senting. Courts can expect the EEOC to oppose this plain language read-
ing as contrary to congressional purpose. 
CATHCART & SNYDEZMAN, supra note 72, at 25. 
85. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988). 
86. 42 U.S.C.A. § 19Rl-a(b)(3) (West Supp. 1992). 
87. !d. 
H8. See supra text accompanying notes 25-32. 
89. See Susan Wubbenhorst, Note, Law Partnership Decisions: Title VII Ap-
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tice in firms with fewer than 5 partners,90 (and presumably 
have fewer than fifteen total support personnel) the majority of 
firms in the U.S. are probably exempt from Title VII liability. 
However, since the law is ambiguous in this area, prudent 
firms with fifteen or more employees (including partners) 
should obviously comply with Title VII. 
B. Impact on Employers and Employees 
1. A Plaintiffs Boon? 
Just as legal commentators and analysts predicted that 
Price Waterhouse would stymie discrimination suits,91 Section 
107's enactment has generated antithetical projections: "Per-
haps more than any other section of the Act, Section 107 has 
the greatest potential for increasing Title VII litigation. The 
most fertile ground for such suits are hiring and promotion 
decisions for executive and professional employment."92 
This prediction may be apt for a number of reasons. First, 
executive and professional decisions involve both objective and 
subjective components. The selection of intimate business asso-
ciates,93 for whom one may be personally liable, necessarily 
requires the subjective evaluation of such traits as competence, 
skills, personal interests, integrity, personality, motivation, and 
plies-Will It Make A Difference?, 53 UMKC L. REV. 46R, 47R-79 (19Rfi). 
90. The Legal Profession Survey: The Rule of Lawyers, THE EcoNOMIS'T, July lH, 
1992, at supp. 5. 
91. See Blumrosen, supra note 67. 
92. CATHCART & SNYDEZMAN, supra note 72, at 29. 
93. Interestingly, the trial court in Hishon compared partnership selection deci-
sions to marriage: 
In a very real sense a professional partnership is like a marriage. It is, 
in fact, nothing less than a "business marriage" for better or worse. Just 
as in marriage different brides bring different qualities into the un-
ion-some beauty, some money, and some character-so also in a profes-
sional partnerships, new mates or partners are Rought and betrothed for 
different reasons and to serve different needs of the partnership. Some 
new partners bring legal skills, others bring clients. Still others bring 
personality and negotiating skills. In both, new mates are expected to 
bring not only ability and industry, but also moral character, fidelity, 
trustworthiness, loyalty, personality, and love. Unfortunately, in partner-
ships, as in matrimony, these needed, worthy and desirable qualities are 
not necessarily divided evenly among the applicants according to race, 
age, sex or religion, and in some they just are not present at all. To use 
or apply Title VII to coerce a mismatched or unwanted partnership too 
closely resembles a statute for the enforcement of shotgun weddings. 
Hishon v. King & Spalding, supra note 22, at 20,062. 
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the ability to work with others. Even Hishon recognized that 
partnership decisions raise concerns about privacy and freedom 
of association.94 
Second, these types of professional decisions frequently 
include observations and evaluations by supervisors and fellow 
employees. As Price Waterhouse illustrates, individuals fre-
quently express opinions in stereotypical terms.95 Since these 
potentially tainted individual views are incorporated into the 
firm or business' larger decision making process, Section 107's 
"motivating factor" formula has potentially profound conse-
quences for professional partnership decisions. 
Third, because of Section 107, upset or disappointed em-
ployees have increased incentive to examine business records, 
evaluations, and forms seeking to uncover any impermissible 
reference to them that might have improperly affected the 
selection process. Formerly, an employer could escape liability 
if impermissible criteria were present or even considered; the 
employer merely needed to show that the forbidden consider-
ation was not a determining factor. 96 Now, plaintiffs and civil 
rights plaintiffs attorneys (many of whom are retained on a 
contingency fee)97 will have the incentive to proceed with Title 
VII suits, since the existence of even one impermissible consid-
eration may subject the employer to a minimum of attorney's 
fees and costs. Liberal discovery rules98 as well as the 
plaintiffs relatively light burden of going forward99 seem cer-
tain to encourage Title VII litigation. 
94. 467 U.S. at 7R. See generally Note, Applicability of Federal 
Antidiscrimination Lef?islation to the Selection of a Law Partner, 76 MICH. L. REV. 
2R2 (1977). This pre-Hishon note discusses the inherent tensions between a law 
firm's desire to decide when and with whom it chooses to do business and society's 
general desire to eliminate discrimination in the workplace. 
9/i. 490 U.S. at 232-37; see supra text accompanying notes 46-47. 
96. See supra text accompanying note li3. 
97. See Blumrosen, supra note 67, at 1050. 
9R. FED. R. C!V. P. 26(b), which applies to all forms of discovery, provides gen-
erally that the parties may "obtain discovery regarding any matter not privileged, 
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action .... " 
99. Section 107 retains the Price Waterhouse balancing paradigm. Consequently, 
after a plaintiff makes out a showing that an illegal consideration may have moti-
vated the defendant's decision, the burden of persuasion shifts to the defendant to 
show that legitimate business considerations would have justified the decision. The 
presence of discriminatory memoranda, evaluations or decision-making documents 
will probably fulfill the plaintiffs initial burden. 
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2. Employer's Defenses 
Perhaps the most immediate and obvious effect section 107 
will have on employers' defenses and litigation strategies is 
that employers will redouble efforts to prevail on the "no dis-
crimination" defense. Under Price Waterhouse, defendants, in 
effect, were given a second chance to avoid liability by invoking 
the "same decision" defense, even though enough evidence 
existed to demonstrate that a discriminatory motive exist-
ed. 100 As a result, defendants had less incentive to settle be-
fore trial. However, since Section 107 abolishes the "same deci-
sion" defense, defendants will probably be more .unenable to 
pre-trial settlement offers and the nuisance value of employee 
suits will increase. 
In addition, employers will argue that Section 107's "a 
motivating factor" language says nothing about the weight to 
be placed on the illegitimate employment consideration. On one 
hand, Section 107 might be read to mean that the presence of a 
discriminatory motive gives rise to an inference that an illegiti-
mate factor influenced the decision. Conversely, defendants 
might argue that the word "motivating," which modifies "fac-
tor," presupposes that the alleged discriminatory consideration 
was more than an incidental part of the challenged decision-
making process. For support, defendants might emphasize that 
five Justices in Price Waterhouse suggested, in varying con-
texts, that an illegitimate motive should be a "substantial fac-
tor" in the decision. 101 If courts embrace these arguments, the 
plaintiff must demonstrate more than the mere fact that dis-
crimination might have entered into the employer's decision 
making process. 
100. See 490 U.S. at 246 (wherein Justice Brennan writes "the employer's bur-
den [of persuasion] is most appropriately deemed an affirmative defense" (emphasis 
added). 
101. In dissent, Justice Kennedy wrote: 
I read the opinions as establishing that in a limited number of cases 
Title VII plaintiffs, by presenting direct and substantial evidence of dis-
criminatory animus, may shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant 
to show that an adverse employment dedsion would have been supported 
by legitimate reasons. The shift in the burden of persuasion occurs only 
where a plaintiff proves by direct evidence that an unlawful motive was a 
substantial factor actually relied upon in making the decision. 
490 U.S. 22H, 2RO (19H9) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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In any event, if Section 107 provides defendants with any 
wiggle room, it will probably be found in the still less-than-
clear "motivating factor" language. Considering the relative 
newness of mixed motive litigation under Title VII, employ-
ers-especially professional firms and partnerships-will do 
well to improve the partnership decision making process. 
V. PARTNERSHIP CRITERIA IN PROFESSIONAL 
FIRMS AND POTENTIAL PITFALLS 
Obviously, Section 107 and its probable effects should 
encourage professional firms to select partners with greater 
caution and formality. In addition, it is important to point out 
that employers still retain considerable discretion in evaluating 
partnership applications and may rely on objective and subjec-
tive criteria. Although these criteria are discussed below in the 
context of partnership selection in law firms, this article's cave-
ats and suggestions apply to all professional firms. 
A. Objective Factors 
Objective factors are rarely attacked as discriminatory 
since most involve empirical criteria and, in theory, apply to all 
partnership candidates equally. Listed below are four objective 
factors that typically weigh heavily in a partnership's admis-
sion decision. 10:l 
1. "Put-In Time" 
So that partners can make an informed, well-reasoned 
evaluation of the associate attorney's abilities, law firms should 
require that the associate be part of the firm for at least a 
minimum period. Although five years used to be considered the 
norm, 103 more firms-especially in larger metropolitan areas 
and with complex practices-are lengthening the minimum 
period to as long as ten years. 104 Each firm should have a 
"put-in time" policy if for no other reason than to prevent the 
appearance of favoritism and caprice in its decision making. 
102. See William F. Lynch II, How Law Firms Select Partners, 70 A.B.A. J. 6fi 
(19R4); sPe also Deborah Grahm, Gaston Snow Charts New Waters with Flexible 
Two-Tier Approach, OF COUNSEL, April 6, 19R7, at 4-10, explaining a large Boston 
firm's partnerRhip selection criteria. 
1m. Lynch, supra note 102, at 6fi. 
104. Brill, supra note fi, at 6. 
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2. Economic value to the firm 
An associate must be profitable. Usually this means that 
an associate must have a high number of billable hours, 105 
which generate revenue for the firm. A rule of thumb used by 
some firms is that associates must generate three times their 
salary to be "profitable."106 
3. Rainmaking skills 
Associates must be able to generate business or have the 
potential to develop business for the firm. 107 A lawyer who 
does not "kill more than he eats" will probably not be consid-
ered seriously for partnership. 108 Few firms can afford part-
ners who do not keep themselves busy and create work for 
other attorneys, paralegals or legal assistants. 
4. Caseload and complexity 
An associate must be an effective case manager and dem-
onstrate the ability to handle cases that are large and complex 
105. Increasingly, law firms are focusing less on billable hours and more on 
"collectibles." "Collectibles" are fees which the law firm realizes from an attorney's 
billings. Obviously, this "bottom line" approach emphasizes what the associate's 
work means to the firm and helps a firm distinguish hard-working associates from 
profitable ones. Interview with Ezra Tom Clark, Jr., President E. T. Clark, Inc. (a 
management consulting firm to the legal profession), in Salt Lake City, Utah (Nov. 
2, 1992). 
106. In these firms, one-third of an associate's revenues covers her salary; one-
third covers her overhead; and one-third goes to the firm as "profits." Interview 
with Ezra Tom Clark, Jr., supra note 105. 
107. Interestingly, many law schools are offering courses to help students focus 
on clients' needs and promote "rainmaking skills." Julie Savarino, Rainmaking 
Joins the Curriculum, NAT'L L.J. July 20, 1992, at 29, col. 4. 
lOR. See Kathleen Donovan, Note, Women Associates' Advancement to Partner 
Status in Private Law Firms, 4 GEo. J. LE<:AL ETHICS U5 (1990): 
[A] reason often given for the discrepancy of the number of women associ-
ates and the number of women partners is lack of "rainmaking." Women 
in general have problems generating new clients for their firms .... 
Lack of access to an "old boy network" is an element of the inability 
to make rain. Private, men-only clubs seem to perpetuate women lawyers' 
difficulty in attracting clients by denying them exposure to the business 
constituents male members are afforded. 
Id. at 14R. 
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by the firm's standards. 109 In effect, an associate must dem-
onstrate the ability to perform at or near partnership level. 
B. Subjective Criteria 
Subjective criteria are just as important as objective crite-
ria. Ilo Subjective considerations include personal integrity, 
loyalty to the firm, interpersonal skills, and the ability to work 
well with others. They also include a person's interests, hobbies 
and activities that are beneficial to the firm and community, 
leadership qualities (as demonstrated in civic, church, political, 
alumni, and bar activities), personal habits, personal appear-
ance, temperament, and physical stamina. 111 
1. Problems with evaluating subjective factors 
Each of these valid considerations, if abused, is fodder for 
Title VII litigation. Law firms must apply these subjective 
criteria without regard to sex. 112 A firm may not assume that 
some qualities or characteristics are desirable for one sex but 
not the other. 113 For example, in Price Waterhouse, partners 
unexcusably criticized Ms. Hopkins because she did not act, 
talk, and walk like a woman and did not wear jewelry or cos-
metics. 114 These comments demonstrate that improper stereo-
types influenced the partners and that Price Waterhouse had 
different promotion criteria and expectations for women, even 
109. For example, in Ezold v. Wolf. Block, Schorr & So/is-Cohen, 758 F. Supp. 
303, 304-0fi (E.D. Pa. 1991), some partners attacked the plaintiffs candidacy be-
cause the female plaintiff was assigned relatively simple cases "that were small by 
Wolf, Block standards" which did not require "more than fiOO hours" per year. 
Most male associates "worked on major matters for which they logged at least 600 
hours per year." Ezold reveals that law firms do consider the complexity of the 
matters handled by an associate and that law firms may engage in discriminatory 
behavior if gender influences work assignments. See infra text accompanying notes 
11fi-21. 
110. Lynch, supra note 102, at 65. 
111. ld. at 66-67. 
112. "In forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their 
sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of 
men and women resulting from sex stereotypes." County of Washington v. Gunther, 
4fi2 U.S. 161, 180 (1981) (quoting Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. 
Manhart, 4:;fi U.S. 702, 707 n.1;:! (1978)). 
U::l. "[S]tandards [should he] shaped only by neutral professional and technical 
considerations and not by any stereotypical notions of female roles and images." 
Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 120fi, 121fi-16 (8th C1r. 198fi). 
114. See supra text accompanying note 47. 
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though men and women candidates for partnership had essen-
tially the same employment duties and responsibilities. 
Similarly, in Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Co-
hen, 115 a prestigious Philadelphia law firm denied a female 
associate, Nancy Ezold, a partnership position despite an over-
all "good" performance rating. 116 In evaluating her candidacy, 
the district court compared Ezold's evaluations with those of 
several male associates who were admitted to the partner-
ship.117 The writing and legal skills of one admitted male 
candidate were described as "acceptable," "dense and mediocre" 
and "bare bones adequacy."118 While some male candidates 
were criticized for lacking sufficient assertiveness, Ezold was 
evaluated negatively for being "very demanding" and "too as-
sertive."119 Not surprisingly, the trial court found that "gen-
der was a determining factor in the failure of the firm to pro-
mote [Ezold] to partnership"120 because Schorr, Block ap-
peared to have weighed "assertiveness," a valid subjective crite-
rion, differently for men and women. 121 
2. Impermissible Sex-based Assumptions 
Law firms must carefully avoid hiring or promotion deci-
sions based on stereotypes and sex-based assumptions. In a 
telling passage from Price Waterhouse, which remains unaf-
fected by Section 107 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act/22 Justice 
Brennan wrote "[W]hile an employer may not take gender into 
account in making an employment decision (except in those 
very narrow circumstances in which gender is a BFOQ [bona 
fide occupational qualification]), it is free to decide against a 
woman for other reasons."123 
In other words, labelling a type of employment "a man's 
job" or a "woman's job" is illegal except in very narrow circum-
11fi. 751 F. Supp. 117fi (E.D. Pa. 1990). 
116. !d. at 11H3. 
117. !d. at 11R4. 
118. !d. at 1184, 1192. 
119. !d. at 1189, 1192. 
120. !d. at 1189. 
121. "The defendant [law firm] is not entitled to apply its standards in a more 
'severe' fashion to female associates." !d. at 1192. 
122. Section 107 abolished the "same decision" defense promulgated by the Price 
Waterhouse plurality. See supra text accompanying note 2. Section 107 does not 
appear to affect the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's sex dis-
crimination guidelines. 
123. 490 U.S. at 244. 
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stances where that consideration is a "bona fide occupational 
qualification."124 Status as an actress or an actor is an exam-
ple of a "BFOQ."125 
Even though it is inconceivable today that professional 
employment could be considered a "man's job," the EEOC's 
promulgations of what does not constitute a BFOQ illustrates 
sex-based assumptions law firms must avoid. For example, the 
assumption that women have a higher turnover rate than men 
is impermissible. 126 In addition, hiring or promotion decisions 
must not be influenced by the assumption that women are less 
capable or aggressive in promoting or marketing. 127 Profes-
sional firms may not consider a client's preferences, 128 a 
woman's marital status, 129 or the possibility of pregnancy. 130 
3. Impact on large and small firms 
To avoid possible Title VII litigation, law firms may de-
emphasize subjective factors in determining partnership selec-
tion decisions. Rewarding associates who have demonstrated 
their economic worth to the firm eliminates many concerns 
about stereotyping and impermissible discrimination. In fact, 
many larger firms appear to be doing this for good reasons. 131 
First, in large firms with hundreds of lawyers scattered all 
across the world, a law firm's argument that a particular candi-
date does not fit the firm's "image" or "style"132 seems 
124. See 29 C.F .R. § 1604.2(a)-(b) (1990). 
12fi. !d. 
126. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(i) (1990). 
127. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(ii) (1990). 
128. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(iii) (1990). 
129. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(c) (1990). 
130. Id.; see also Barbano v. Madison County, 922 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1990). In 
Barbano one member of a five-person Madison County Veteran's Affairs Committee 
asked a prospective female employee about "her plans on having a family and 
whether her husband would object to her transporting male veterans" as part of 
her employment duties. The Second Circuit concluded that all members present at 
the meeting, not just the committee member who asked the discriminatory 
questions, had discriminated against the plaintiff. !d. at 146. 
131. Brill, supra note fi, at fi. 
132. In Ezold, Ms. Ezold was told during interviews that "it would not be easy 
for her [at the firm] because she was a woman, was not from an Ivy League Law 
School, (Ms. Ezold [wa]s a graduate of Villanova Law School) and was not on Law 
Review." 7fi1 F. Supp. 1175 (E.D. Pa. 1990). See also Lawrence Lederman, Entering 
a World of Rules, NAT'L. L.J., August 1989, (Special Student Edition) at 16-17, 21, 
where the author describes the difficulty of feeling comfortable in a prestigious 
New York City law firm in the 1960s because he had a lower middle class back-
ground, he did not attend an Ivy League school, and he did not have correct social 
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disingenuous. 133 Second, courts which have found partner-
ships liable for discrimination have examined the size of the 
firm and the prestige associated with partnership status. In 
Price Waterhouse, after remand from the Supreme Court, the 
trial court noted that Price Waterhouse had nine-hundred part-
ners in ninety offices across the United States and that "only a 
small percentage of the partners [hadl ever met [the plain-
tiff]."134 The court also commented that "Price Waterhouse 
lacks the intimacy and interdependence of smaller partner-
ships, so concerns about freedom of association have little 
force." 13" 
However, in smaller and mid-sized firms where attorneys 
are expected to know each other and are likely to work togeth-
er at least occasionally, legitimate subjective considerations 
mean more and should be given serious consideration. Howev-
er, smaller law firms should not be lulled into thinking Title 
VII's reach does not apply to them. Hishon makes clear that 
Title VII applies to all law firms "large enough to be covered by 
Title VII."136 Interestingly, smaller and mid-sized law firms, 
which need to evaluate partnership candidates more subjective-
ly than their larger counterparts, are the firms least likely to 
take time to educate their personnel and create procedures and 
structures to avert Title VII trouble. 
VI. POLICIES AND PROCEDURES TO LIMIT 
TITLE VII LIABILITY 
Because the traditional criteria that professional firms use 
to select partners are more likely to result in Title VII litiga-
tion, prudent law firms should consider the following policies 
and procedures. 
A Education 
One of the law's oldest maxims is "ignorance of the law is 
no excuse." Partners who evaluate candidates should know 
what Title VII says and understand Section 107's ramifications 
on partnership selection decisions. Partners must know that 
aspirations. 
133. Lynch, supra note 102, at 67. 
134. 737 F. Supp. at 1210. 
135. !d. 
136. Hishon, 476 U.S. at 77-78, n.10. See supra text accompanying notes 82-83, 
discussing Title VII's non-application to firms with fewer than fifteen employees. 
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stereotyped evaluations, sex-based assumptions and character-
izations are inappropriate and illegal. 
Firms could convey this information and safeguard their 
procedures in several ways. First, circulate in-house memoran-
da detailing the status of the law and its application to part-
nership selection decisions. Second, discuss firm evaluation 
procedures and practices at firm meetings, retreats, or confer-
ences. Third, attach instructions about the impropriety of ste-
reotyped and gender specific comments on all of the firm's 
evaluation forms, including partnership evaluation forms and 
periodic associate evaluations. Fourth, choose one or several 
attorneys to review all written evaluations, eliminating forms 
or comments that contain discriminatory evaluations. 
B. Implement regular associate evaluations 
Perhaps the best way to prevent Title VII lawsuits is to 
implement an evaluation system that provides associates with 
regular reviews and feedback. Such evaluations should be held 
at least once a year, and preferably more often. 137 A formal, 
written evaluation system allows the partnership to measure 
an employee's progress during regular interviews and elimi-
nates ad-hoc, retrospective and vague evaluations. Periodic 
evaluations of associates should include comments regarding an 
associate's progress in meeting the firm's objective require-
ments and subjective standards. 
Associates will also benefit from regular evaluations. Asso-
ciates will know how the partnership feels about their perfor-
mance and if their chances for partnership are realistic. Associ-
ates will be able to discuss and challenge their evaluations 
when they are given, rather than when their candidacies for 
partnership are rejected. Considering a plaintiffs relatively 
light burden under Title VII, 138 partnerships that keep regu-
lar, detailed, and discrimination-free evaluations will do much 
to prevent injurious litigation. Not coincidentally, the procedur-
al history of Hishon reveals that no written evaluations were 
communicated to the aggrieved associate. 
137. Paul Zamfsky, How the Hishon Decision Will Affect Your Firm, 70 A.B.A. J. 
fiR, 61 (19R4). 
13R. See supra notes 9R-99. 
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C. "Objectify" subjective factors 
To the extent possible, a law finn should "objectify" each 
valid subjective consideration. For example, a law finn might 
describe in written fonn the image that the firm wishes to 
project, and define how an associate is expected to behave with 
other attorneys, office personnel and clients. Detailed guide-
lines will help associates know what is expected and what the 
firm deems important. 139 
However, law finns must realize that more is at stake than 
avoiding Title VII liability. In their quest to "objectify" subjec-
tive criteria, law finns should not stifle creativity and alienate 
talented associates with somewhat different backgrounds, life-
styles and interests. In fact, as the nation's economy becomes 
more "global" (i.e., "multi-cultural"), finns should encourage 
internal diversity if for no other reason than it makes good 
business sense. It is no secret that individuals with similar 
religious, ethnic, racial, and cultural backgrounds tend to do 
business with each other. Rather than discourage minority or 
female associates from breaking the finn mold, firms should 
promote diversity and encourage efforts to reach out to all 
sectors of the community. In short, law finns must balance 
their needs for internal homogeneity against the reality of busi-
ness development in an increasingly heterogenous world. 
D. Input by female and minority partners 
If a finn is large enough to delegate its partnership selec-
tion decision to a committee, female and minority partners 
should be included. 140 Their inclusion will eliminate "subcon-
scious bias" and demonstrate the finn's commitment to promot-
ing qualified persons to partnership regardless of race or gen-
der. Disappointed applicants will be less inclined to feel victim-
ized by discrimination if they believe that a similarly situated 
person-with real input in the decision making pro-
cess141-evaluated their candidacies. Finns may also consider 
1:39. Attorneys may bristle at these suggestions, arguing that such "guidelines" 
undermine the professional elan of law firms. However, many law firms today 
resemble multinational corporations and large business with branch offices scat-
tered across the country. If large law firms expect to limit their own liability, they 
must manage themselves internally like other large businesses. 
140. Zarefsky, supra note 1:37, at 61. 
141. If minority and female committee members have no real power, matters 
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establishing internal equal employment and opportunity com-
mittees to ensure that the firm's hiring goals and promotion 
practices comply with Title VII. 142 
E. Tone-down recruiting promises: 
In Hishon, the Supreme Court held that Title VII applies 
to law firms and ruled that if the evidence at trial established 
that the parties contracted to have the plaintiff considered for 
partnership, that promise was a term, condition, or privilege of 
employment. 143 The Court's ruling was unquestionably influ-
enced by Ms. Hishon's apparent reliance on the defendant 
firm's representations that advancement to partnership was "a 
matter of course" for associates who received satisfactory 
evaluations.144 
As Hishon illustrates, the initial offer of employment, 
whether oral or written, may come back to haunt the firm. 
Consequently, law firms should re-evaluate what promises or 
inducements its recruiters make to would-be associates. Law 
firms probably do not need to tell prospective associates what 
most of them already know (i.e., partnership is not automatic), 
but law firms should not hint or suggest that partnership is a 
sure thing or respond less than candidly to such inquiries. This 
advice is especially relevant when firms extend offers of em-
ployment to lateral associates or third year law students who 
have not worked for, or been exposed to, the firm. These associ-
ates are less likely to know the firm's expectations and require-
ments for partnership and the likelihood that they will become 
partners in the future. In addition, law firms that are in the 
practice of retaining permanent associates should inform un-
aware candidates of this possibility and not overstate a typical 
associate's chances for partnership. 
F. Consider alternatives to ((up or out" promotion schemes 
Law firms that do not conduct regular personal evaluations 
and have "up or out" promotion policies are vulnerable candi-
dates for Title VII litigation. From an associate's perspective 
will be made worse. Institutionalized window dressing and tokenism may result in 
situations where, paraphrasing the words of Federalist 10, the "cure is worse than 
the disease." 
142. Zarefsky, supra note la7, at 61. 
143. 467 U.S. at 76. 
144. Id. 
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this situation presents the worst of both worlds: terminated 
employment and no formal, advance notification. Under such 
conditions, fired associates can hardly be expected to react with 
grace and docility. 
Increasingly, law firms are allowing associates who do not 
make partner to stay on with the firm as "permanent associ-
ates."145 With the consequences of non-partnership less dras-
tic, potentially aggrieved associates are presumably less likely 
to sue their current employer. More importantly from the law 
firm's perspective, this makes economic sense: an associate's 
raison d'etre is to make money for the firm. Since the firm has 
probably invested considerable time and money training the 
associate, bringing on a replacement associate with the atten-
dant training costs does not always make economic sense. 
In short, law firms which retain the "up or out" policy 
should commit themselves to regular and informative periodic 
evaluations of associates. Law firms should also consider imple-
menting a "permanent associate" policy to alleviate the effects 
of non-partnership. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Title VII claims against law firms for discrimination in the 
partner selection process will probably increase because of legal 
changes wrought by the 1991 Civil Rights Act and changing le-
gal demographics. The 1991 Civil Rights Act abrogates an 
employer's "same decision" defense and imposes Title VII liabil-
ity if the impermissible consideration was a "motivating factor" 
in the employer's decision to reject an employee's candidacy. 
These changes correspond with a marked increase in minorities 
and females entering the legal profession. Consequently, law 
firms must understand Title VII as amended and implement 
preventative policies and procedures. Specifically, firms should 
educate their partners about Title VII's requirements, evaluate 
associates regularly using written evaluations, inform associ-
ates about the firm's objective and subjective partnership crite-
ria, seek input from minority and female firm members, tone-
down recruiting promises, and consider alternatives to "up or 
14fi. Zarefsky, supra note 1::17 at fi8. See generally, Grahm, supra note 102. 
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out" promotion schemes. Last, and perhaps most important, 
law firms must realize that a heterogenous law firm reflecting 
an increasingly diverse society may be in the firm's long-term 
economic self-interest. 
Ezra T. Clark III 
